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Experiment, Theory, Representation:
Robert Hooke’s Material Models
Matthew Hunter
Robert Hooke’s Micrographia of 1665 is an epochal work in the history of scien-
tific representation. With microscopes and other optical devices, Hooke drew and
then oversaw the engraving of Micrographia’s plates, images that amount to little
less than revelations from beneath the range of human vision (Fig. 1). In bristling
detail, molds flower into putrid bloom, crystals protrude like warts from mineral
skins and, for the first time in history, cells are brought to the eyes of a general
viewership. So historical scholarship has shown us, Hooke was especially well
equipped to make these wondrous images. A product of Oxford’s lively scientific
community of the 1650s and a protégé of the chemist Robert Boyle, he possessed
intimate knowledge of the “new sciences” of the seventeenth century and a partic-
ular gift as an experimentalist. Indeed, from 1662 until nearly the end of his life,
Hooke held the post of “Curator of Experiments” to England’s premier scientific
institution, the then newly-formed Royal Society of London. But, Hooke also had
an additional advantage. Following some remarkable, juvenile feats of drawing, he
had previously been apprenticed to Peter Lely, leading portrait painter of later sev-
enteenth century England. Combining scientific training with tutelage in the art of
portraiture—that most detail-attentive of pictorial genres (at least as practiced in
seventeenth century England)—Hooke would seem to have commanded the ideal
skills for rendering the sights made perceptible through microscopes. Not surpris-
ingly, Hooke’s Micrographia has served as an important point of reference in recent
studies of the interactions of art and science.
Yet, as the plates and pages of Micrographia attest, Hooke’s investigations
of nature also made use of representations that were neither pictures nor clearly
picture-like. Directly below his elegant rendering of crystals in Micrographia’s
seventh plate, Hooke presents the viewer with a sequence of eleven incremental
combinations of circular forms. So he explains, these diagrams denote not anything
seen by a microscope, but patterns of crystalline vegetation he had generated by
making groups of spherical “bullets” vibrate together. “If put on an inclining plain,
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Fig. 1 Magnified mineral crystals and crystalline substructures from Robert Hooke, Micrographia
(London: Jo. Martyn and Ja. Allestry, 1665), Scheme VII. This item is reproduced by permission
of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California
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Fig. 2 Visible aspect and anatomy of comets from Robert Hooke, Lectures and Collections
(London: Printed for J. Martyn, 1678), Table 1. This item is reproduced by permission of The
Huntington Library, San Marino, California
so that they may run together”, Hooke claimed, these bullets would “naturally run
into a triangular order, composing all the variety of figures that can be imagin’d to
be made out of aequilateral triangles” (1665, 85). A little over a decade later, Hooke
published a treatise on a comet that had appeared over Northern Europe in the spring
of 1677 (Fig. 2). Variously representing the comet’s flight in accompanying prints,
Hooke again detailed an action by which the meteoric object could be known. The
reader is to suspend a wax ball covered with iron filings into a long beaker that has
been filled with a solution of diluted sulfuric acid. Thus, Hooke proclaims, “you
may plainly observe a perfect representation of the Head, Halo, and Beard [or tail]
of the Comet” (1678a, 31).
What are these actions that Hooke proposes with agitated bullets and balls of wax
in acid? How do these procedures, which are ubiquitous in Hooke’s enterprise but
rarely analyzed in historical studies, relate to his graphic representations? And what
might art historians or philosophers of science learn from them?
By focusing upon these two particular cases from Robert Hooke’s oeuvre, this
essay aims to pursue a broader problem. That is, I suggest how researchers in the
humanities and social sciences might learn from recent work in analytic philosophy
of science to reconsider practices of representation shared between art and science.
The time is particularly ripe for such rethinking. As philosophers in the analytic
tradition have begun to look to the arts to understand the complexities of representa-
tions used in science, so art historians have increasingly sought to examine images
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made beyond the boundaries of the Western artistic tradition, especially those visual
practices generated by the sciences. Nonetheless, for studies of the early modern
period (ca. 1400–1800), the art of painting and modes of depiction proper to it have
continued to guide thinking about representation. Spurred by the remarkably natu-
ralistic feats of depiction that began to appear in early fifteenth century Florence and
Bruges, researchers have sought to identify profound shifts in the orders of scientific
knowledge embodied therein. As one recent scholar has asked: “Why did naturalism
in painting arise with the new science? What was the relationship between artistic
and scientific representations of nature in early modern Europe?” (Smith 2004, viii).
Address to such questions has certainly advanced our understanding of the
vital cross-pollinations between pictorial art and empirical science in early modern
Europe. Significant work in art history, for example, has demonstrated how—from
Leon Battista Alberti’s “rationalization of sight” to Vesalius’ anatomies and on
to Galileo’s studies of the moon—representational techniques generated by early
modern painters materially advanced techniques of scientific illustration and inves-
tigation (Ivins 1938, Pächt 1950, Panofsky 1962, Edgerton 1984, Bredekamp 2000).
A reciprocal strain of historical study has explored how optical sciences and instru-
ments informed the naturalistic turns of painting in Renaissance and Baroque
Europe (Lindberg 1976, Steadman 2002, Kemp 1990, Hockney 2001). And more
recent, interdisciplinary literature aligned with “science studies” has emphasized
how the mimetic naturalism exemplified in early modern painting might be seen as
a general model for the aspirations of the emergent natural sciences. “The picture
in general, and painting in particular”, so one such study has claimed, “. . . emerges
as a dominant paradigm for the whole system of modes of representation constitu-
tive of early modern philosophy, religion and science as well as literary or aesthetic
culture” (Braider 2004, 46).
Robert Hooke has figured significantly in the formulation of these positions. In a
hugely influential work from 1983, art historian Svetlana Alpers (1983) cast Hooke
as a leading exemplar of the “descriptive impulse”—the penchant for the detail-
attentive, naturalistic “picturing” of appearances—that she identified in the still-life
and genre paintings of Dutch art, and ascribed generally to the science and culture of
seventeenth century Northern Europe. Posed by Alpers as a heuristic corrective for
viewing the Northern European pictorial tradition outside of the hegemonic stan-
dards of Italian art, descriptive picturing has itself become a norm. Especially in
studies of the early modern period, talk of copying or picturing nature has become
paradigmatic for discussions of representation in scientific contexts (Shapin and
Schaffer 1985, Ogilvie 2006).1 In turn, this apparent sympathy of aims between
artistic and scientific representation has given a new encouragement to studies of
art in Hooke’s native Britain. Increasingly, researchers have looked to the Royal
Society, and to Hooke specifically, for sources of an empirical bent that can be
traced into the rising tradition of eighteenth century British painters such as William
Hogarth and John Constable (Bermingham 2000, Gibson-Wood 2000). If artistic
1Interesting variations upon this direction are Freedberg (2002) and Daston and Galison (2007).
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training informed the gaze of scientists like Hooke, this story suggests, so their
empirical ethos should be seen as underpinning the pictorial achievements of the
Enlightenment.
The objective of this essay is neither to take issue with these readings nor to
re-stage old debates over the adequacy of Alpers’ notion of “description” for under-
standing early modern painting (de Jongh 1984, Marin 1986). Indeed, if my point of
departure is to ask whether this approach offers compelling terms for understanding
the material models of Robert Hooke, my argument aims to complement the broader
rethinking of art in later Baroque Britain. I do so by showing how recent philoso-
phy of science enables us to apprehend the representational sophistication and sheer
imaginative virtuosity of Hooke, Christopher Wren and their colleagues in the early
Royal Society with new clarity and vigor.
Certainly, there is enough in Hooke’s work to encourage the reading already
available to humanities-based scholarship. Beyond his apprenticeship to the
Netherlandish painter Lely, Hooke was a keen advocate of accurate representation
whose scientific writings deploy various concepts from the “mimeticist tradition”
(Halliwell 2002). Nonetheless, recent historical research has identified two impor-
tant reasons for reconsidering this dominance of the pictorial. The first reason is a
matter of focus. As historians of the built environment have shown, Royal Society
Fellows like Hooke and Wren simply produced a huge body of visual work that was
not pictorial. Central agents in the rebuilding of London after the fire of 1666, their
collective endeavors like engineering the dome of St. Paul’s Cathedral or design-
ing telescopic observatories and mental hospitals are fascinating intersections of
artistic and scientific endeavor; but they have little obvious relationship with the
terms of pictorial representation (Cooper 2003, Stevenson 2005, Jardine 2003a, b).
The second reason for reconsidering the interpretive appeal to painting is a matter
of relative value. Historians of art have long lamented that painting was signifi-
cantly underdeveloped in seventeenth century Britain, especially in comparison with
Continental models (Waterhouse 1953, Pears 1988). While numerous, competing
painting schools flooded the sophisticated art markets of the seventeenth century
Netherlands and painters received royal patronage of their academy in Louis XIV’s
France, indigenous pictorial traditions in Britain prior to the eighteenth century
are, by contrast, notoriously fragmentary.2 Hardly an unalloyed good let alone a
paradigm of knowledge, the art of painting was, moreover, a practice from which
many English scientists sought to distance themselves and the representations they
did employ. If his scientific colleague William Cole dismissed painting and sculp-
ture as “things uselesse” pursued only for the “lusts of pride and ostentatious vanity”
(ca. 1692, f 159), Hooke himself treated pictures with caution.3 “The Pictures of
Things which only served for Ornament or Pleasure”, he warned, are “. . . rather
noxious than useful, and serves to divert and disturbs the Mind” (Hooke 1705,
64). And while advocated by some of the Royal Society’s gentlemen-amateurs,
2For a revision of this argument, see Gibson-Wood (2002).
3On these points more broadly, see my (2010).
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evidence suggests that the kind of naturalistic pictures most valued by recent inter-
preters is precisely that which Hooke and Wren performed early in their careers and
subsequently delegated to their assistants (Hunter 2007).
If a focus upon painting thus feels like an increasingly arbitrary imposition upon
the visual activities and values of Hooke and his circles, the conceptual situation
becomes even worse when their expressly scientific representations are examined in
detail. Ostensibly, this would be the business of the history of science. But, despite
the fact that they were performed and studied at the very center of scientific commu-
nities like the Royal Society, historians of science have had very little to say about
the representational structure of events like Hooke’s bullet manipulations and his
effervescent wax comet. Instead, studies have tended to focus upon various socio-
political objectives accomplished through such performances or via images related
to them (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, Fyfe and Law 1988, Golinski 1989, Lynch and
Woolgar 1990). Without disputing the interest of such work, the complementary
proposal of this essay is simple. Before we reduce these largely-uncharted seas of
visualization to the terms of mimetic naturalism—and before we art historians con-
struct elaborate pre-histories of Enlightenment art upon them—it behooves students
of science and art alike to first analyze those representational operations in which
Hooke’s community invested so much epistemological and financial capital. To do
so, researchers in the humanities and social sciences can learn much from emerging
work in analytic philosophy of science.
To this project, Hooke’s aforementioned performances present at least three sig-
nificant, interpretive obstacles; I will call these concerns methodological, categorical
and quasi-existential. To an art historian, the major methodological problem is obvi-
ous: when considering procedures such these, frequently no object survives around
which to organize analysis. At the very least, we would want to know if the spherical
bullets or the glass beaker Hooke claimed to use for his actions possessed (or, as we
will see, could have possessed) some unusual properties that made them uniquely
capable of representing his targets of investigation. Surely it is true that, as the remit
of art history has expanded in recent decades, the graphic resources, theoretical writ-
ings, and other kinds documentation upon which I will draw in this analysis have
eroded the privileged evidentiary position once commanded by the art-object. But,
given the discipline’s residual methodological orientation toward objects (Koerner
1999), the approach I employ here has been to attempt to supply, as it were, replace-
ment objects, using a modest version of the strategies of replication developed in
the history of science.4 And here, the methodological conservativeness of art his-
tory may actually become a virtue as it forces us to focus upon exactly how Hooke’s
models were supposed to have worked and what roles physical objects could have
(or could never have) played in them.
More substantial is the second, categorical concern. To some readers, the inter-
pretation ventured here might be read as committing a category error by treating as
representations what should really be understood as experiments, the central means
4For a recent application of this approach with a useful bibliography, see Heering (2008).
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of intervening into reality advanced by Hooke and his colleagues. Because repre-
sentation and experiment are not only distinguished from but often opposed to one
another in philosophical accounts, address to this categorical concern must be cen-
tral to this and other studies of experimentalist representation. It is with this worry
that I will begin. The third concern, though, is almost an existential one. That is, why
should art historians care about the strange performances of brilliant but eccentric
characters like Robert Hooke? What does this tell us about art? I will engage these
quasi-existential charges directly only in the conclusion; but my analysis follows
from the conviction that how we answer these questions powerfully reveals what
we want explorations of the art/science conversation to do. Building from work by
scholars like James Elkins and Peter Galison, my contention is that humanities-
based studies of visual materials only become more interesting and intellectually
rigorous as we increase our engagement with science. (Elkins 1999, 2007, 2008, see
“Visual Practices Across the University” this volume, and Galison 1997) Therefore,
if we want to understand how representation in art and science might speak to one
another—indeed, if there are more than passing coincidences between naturalism
in art and empiricism in science—then we need to scrutinize the representational
procedures that were central to emerging science with as close attention as has been
paid to practices of representation in art.
This, then, is not just a call for interdisciplinary dialogue for its own sake. For, if
these methodological, categorical and quasi-existential worries can be allayed, what
becomes available to interpretation is an excitingly open, but absolutely central,
field of inquiry wherein representation may be approached anew. Released from the
powerful gravitational pull of painting, art historians might begin to reckon more
successfully with the visual achievement of Hooke, Wren and their colleagues who
remain highly problematic to available accounts. Beyond learning from the flexi-
bility, stylization and deep inaccuracies of scientific representations as they appear
in recent philosophy of science, moreover, I show how historians can productively
draw from this literature to reconsider what kinds of cognitive work representations
were being asked to perform in early scientific contexts; why diverse styles of repre-
sentation could have been useful; and what modes of knowledge they might be said
to embody. Reciprocally, historically-based contributions such as this one may bring
to philosophical consideration how play between graphic imagery, performance
with material models, and theory deserves to be integrated into more generalized
accounts of representation as practiced in the arts, sciences, and beyond.
Gross Similitudes
I want to begin by returning to the categorical concern sketched above. That is,
are the procedures Robert Hooke described with bullets or his operations with wax
balls in acid really representations at all? The question deserves to be posed because
an important tradition within philosophy of science has seen Hooke as exemplary
of a significant shift within the sciences, one defined by the differentiation of
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experiments from representation. Thomas Kuhn has counted Hooke among those
who inaugurated this qualitative shift in the enterprise of experimentation in the sev-
enteenth century. From antiquity through the Renaissance, Kuhn argues, everyday
observation and the exercise of reason had been sufficient grounds for compe-
tence in major fields of physical science. Experiment in this pre-modern context
was properly thought experiment, which aimed at demonstration of known princi-
ples or exposition of their particulars. By contrast, Kuhn claims, when “men like
Gilbert, Boyle, and Hooke, performed experiments, they seldom aimed to demon-
strate what was already known or to determine a detail required for the extension
of existing theory. Rather they wished to see how nature would behave under pre-
viously unobserved, often previously nonexistent, circumstances” (1977, 43). In
this new, “Baconian” definition of the seventeenth century, experiment was rad-
ically productive of data and, by that measure, not re-presentational at all. Ian
Hacking has influentially endorsed a similar view of Hooke the experimenter. In
Hacking’s memorable words, Hooke was “a crusty old character who picked fights
with people—partly because of his own lower status as an experimenter” (1983,
151). Because of the field’s bias towards theories and representations, Hacking
claims, philosophers of science give scant attention to experimentalists like Hooke
who were committed to manipulating reality. By these views, Hooke is not only to
be strongly identified with experiment, but he figures among those crucial, historical
agents who brought into being practices of experiment that could be meaningfully
differentiated from representation for the first time.
If his work abounds with examples, Hooke’s theoretical writings shed only
limited light on these boundaries of experiment. In a famous paper from the
early 1660s, for example, Hooke defines the “Reason of making Experiments” as
the very general aim of “Discovery of the Method of nature in its Progress and
Operations” (Hooke 1726, 26). What available literature there is on Hooke’s exper-
imentalism also encourages softening philosophers’ categorical distinction between
representation and experiment. Social historians of science have emphasized how
the experiments performed at the Royal Society’s meetings in the later seventeenth
century were rarely the bald confrontations with nature as envisioned by Kuhn.
Experiments would be tried extensively in private laboratories before their demon-
stration to the scientific fellowship. So Steven Shapin has contended, “the weekly
meetings of the Royal Society required not trials [of experiments] but shows and
discourses” (1999, 497). In this reading, a public experiment was always a kind of
representation insofar as it was a demonstrative replication of results previously
obtained elsewhere. But, in turning specifically to analysis of Hooke’s trials, I
want to consider if and how a project like the bullet manipulation can be seen to
participate in experiment’s celebrated intervention into nature at all.
In Micrographia, Hooke introduces the bullet manipulation in the context of his
microscopic observations of flint, casserite, alum and other mineral crystals. [See
Fig. 1] Why, Hooke asks, do minerals like these betray remarkable formal con-
sistencies? By way of explanation, Hooke appeals to a significant component of
his physical thought, the theory of congruity. As Mary Hesse (1966a) has noted,
Hooke understood diverse physical phenomena disclosed by his experiments to be
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products of particulate matter in vibrating motion. In turn, his theory of congruity
stipulated that bodies of the same (or proportional) mass or vibrating frequency
would attract one another; “incongruous” bodies, which have different masses and
non-proportional frequencies, would repulse. In his later writings, Hooke could
formulate this theory in economical terms as “nothing else but an agreement or dis-
agreement of Bodys as to their Magnitudes and motions” (1678b, 7). But, in early
works like Micrographia, congruity and incongruity are often suggested through a
catalogue of vibrating phenomena. The cohesion of congruous bodies, for example,
is explained in the following terms:
I suppose the pulse of heat to agitate the small parcels of matter, and those that are of a
like bigness, and figure, and matter, will hold, or dance together, and those which are of
a differing kind will be thrust or shov’d out from between them; for particles that are all
similar, will, like so many equal musical strings equally stretcht, vibrate together in a kind
of Harmony or unison (1665, 15).
Although they generally agree on the importance of Hooke’s theory of congruity
to his broader mechanical philosophy, historians of science have been divided on
its implications. John Henry (1989) and Penelope Gouk (1999) have read Hooke’s
materialism as a continuation of Renaissance natural magic, while Mark Ehrlich
(1992) and Michael Hunter (2003) see his matter theory as characteristic of the
rationalizing tendencies in seventeenth century science which would form the basis
of classical mechanics. Most interestingly, Ofer Gal (2002) has argued that because
Hooke’s theory of congruity was a key component in his thinking on attraction at a
distance, it might be seen as having material consequence for the theory of univer-
sal gravitation elaborated by his sometime-interlocutor and later great enemy, Isaac
Newton.
However its influences and intricacies may be parsed out, the key point here
is that Hooke’s theory of congruity closely shadows his bullet operation. Because
of the force of congruity, Hooke explains, homogenous matter in its most fluid,
agitated form would be “driven . . . and forc’t into as little a space as it can possibly
be confined in” (1665, 17). When highly agitated, this congruous matter would form
into spheroids, which he calls “globules”. Hooke’s contention is that crystal patterns
in minerals can be explained by appeal to “three or four several positions or postures
of Globular particles, and those the most plain, obvious, and necessary conjunctions
of such figur’d particles that are possible” (1665, 85). Support for this claim is then
offered by the bullet trial itself. So Hooke explains in full:
I have ad oculum demonstrated with a company of bullets, and some few other very simple
bodies . . . that there was not any regular Figure, which I have hitherto met withal, of any
of those bodies that I have above named, that I could not with the composition of bullets
or globules, and one or two other bodies, imitate, even almost by shaking them together.
And thus for instance we may find that the Globular bullets will of themselves, if put on an
inclining plain, so that they may run together, naturally run into a triangular order, compos-
ing all the variety of figures that can be imagin’d to be made out of aequilateral triangles
(1665, 85).
At the most basic level, then, bullets vibrated on an inclined plane are claimed to
yield the kinds of formal configurations observable in mineral crystals.
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So, is this an experiment? An informative way into this question is simply to
press upon how Hooke’s procedure was supposed to have worked. Even the most
fundamental aspects of this action are problematic. Hooke contends that bullets (a
term, according to the OED, derived from the diminutive of the French boule, thus
a small round ball) in his manipulation would move into the geometrical forms he
diagrams “even almost by shaking them together” (1665, 85). Yet, such behavior
runs counter to the major works of seventeenth century physics, which Hooke knew
well. In Two New Sciences (1974, 87–88), Galileo had outlined how balls mov-
ing on an inclined plane (the trial situation Hooke stipulates) would attain identical
velocities if the resistance of air and friction are eliminated. In the terms formulated
by Newton some twenty years after Micrographia, the bullets would be expected
remain in rectilinear motion until acted upon by other forces, reacting equally and
oppositely to their encounters with other bullets (Newton 1989, 14–24). Hooke’s
bullets behave otherwise. They do not scatter or project off the edges of the trial
surface, but gather into regular groups. [See Fig. 1]
For his part, Hooke is extremely vague about the exact nature of the trial,
explaining nothing of the friction, agitation and angle of the plane nor the masses,
diameters, or possible velocities of his bullets. Perhaps it is possible that the patterns
of attraction between bullets that Hooke describes could have been achieved had his
spheroids possessed some degree of magnetism, a property on which Hooke exper-
imented and clearly saw as related to his notion of congruity (1665, 31). Yet, no
such property is ever stipulated for the bullets in the trial and Hooke even suggests
that the specified results can be achieved with non-magnetic objects. Although the
frailties of Hooke’s experimental contrivances have become well known to recent
historians (Shapin and Schaffer 1985), the only success I have had at replicating the
stipulated behavior with non-magnetized “bullets” has come from introducing the
spheroids into a bowl and not on the inclined plane Hooke describes (Fig. 3).
Baffling as it is, the physical difficulties, if not impossibility, of Hooke’s bullet
operation helps to clarify its objectives. Rather than seeing it exclusively as an exper-
imental intervention that produces new data from a natural target, the trial might be
better conceived as a mechanism through which a theoretical precept (namely, the
theory of congruity) can be visualized to understand a phenomenon (here, the for-
mal regularity of mineral-crystal formation). In this capacity, Hooke’s trial has a
clear representational aspect. Parsed in crude terms, the bullets represent theoretical
entities called globules, while the agitation of the inclined plane simulates the vibrat-
ing motion of congruity; I want to return momentarily to the procedure’s semantic
dimensions and particularly to what might be called its “enigma of representation”.
According to the representation’s logic, incremental addition of bullets is claimed to
reveal the possible field of formal permutations available to crystals. By using “25,
or 27, or 36, or 42, &c.” bullets, Hooke insists, the scientist can “find out all the vari-
ety of regular shapes, into which the smooth surfaces of [a mineral like] Alum are
form’d” (1665, 86). Thus, if we disregard its practical mechanics for a moment, the
bullet manipulation might be read as both a visualization of the rudimentary compo-
nent particles and forces yielding crystalline structures and a means for generating
rules of combination with which to predict the target’s possible patterns at higher
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Fig. 3 Author’s reconstruction of Hooke’s bullet manipulation. This replication was produced by
incrementally introducing stainless steel ball-bearings (diameter: 1 cm) into the curved surface of
a shallow bowl (roughly parabolic curvature, diameter: 14 cm, depth: 6 cm)
levels of formal complexity. The bullet trial is a representational process that pro-
duces data from an artificial situation as a means to understand a natural target. By
this reading, Hooke’s bullets can be understood as a model of crystallization (Frigg
and Hartmann 2006).
Arguably, art historians are better equipped to study the data produced by this
representation than to interpret Hooke’s crystallization model itself. For, in this case,
the data are graphic images. Hooke has transcribed the model’s informational yield
in Micrographia’s figures A–L where the resulting bullet-patterns are rendered as
sequences of spare, circular forms circumscribed within geometrical solids. (Fig. 1)
No doubt an interesting art-historical account might be written by narrating how
Hooke’s denotation of the spherical bullets as abstract geometrical entities fits in
histories of crystallographic representation, the larger development of diagrammatic
notation, or the anti-naturalistic tendencies of later seventeenth century scientific
illustration.5 Yet, what is crucial to underscore are the two stages of representation
5On these topics, see respectively Elkins (1999, 13–30); Wilson (2002); and Freedberg (2002).
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disclosed by attention to these diagrammatic figures in Micrographia. This doubled
reference might be schematized in the following way:
Figures −−−(depict)−−−> Bullets −−−−(represent)−−> “Globules”
As is signaled by the parentheses, no particular accounts of reference are yet
subscribed to here. But, the fundamental point is this: by whatever means we might
explain how Hooke’s inked markings in Micrographia answer to the bullets he
claimed to have manipulated, the vexing relationship between those bullets and
“globules” still demands explanation as well. It is upon this second, neglected half
of the schematic figure that I will focus in the analysis that follows.
Let us return, then, to the “how” of Hooke’s crystallization model. In outlining
directions for expanded thinking on scientific representation, philosopher of science
Roman Frigg has described what he calls “the problem of how models represent
their targets as ‘the enigma of representation’” (2006, 50). Frigg’s terms are par-
ticularly appropriate to Hooke’s perplexing crystallization model. Indeed, it is both
perplexing and mysterious; there is no documentation of the model’s performance at
the Royal Society and all we know about it comes from the pages of Micrographia.
There, Hooke had claimed that crystals are naturally formed by the vibrating
motion of matter as it gathers into particles called globules. Governed by congruity
and incongruity, globular matter then consolidates into regular crystal patterns.
If, as has been suggested, Hooke’s model makes bullets stand for globules and a
vibrating inclined plane represent the conditions of congruity, by virtue of what is
this a representation?
Following the dominant interpretive approach, we might account for these enig-
matic properties by appealing to criteria of depiction as borrowed from the model’s
representation in Micrographia’s plate. Depicting and representing, as indicated in
the scheme above, would thus be the same. And following Hooke’s earlier appeal
to the bullets’ “imitative” capacity, we might read the whole enterprise through the
central vein of mimesis in which early modern European learned cultures under-
stood human arts. In this tradition inherited from Classical antiquity, such artifice
followed from a universal human compulsion to mimic. Where Aristotle had iden-
tified the sources of these techne mimetike in the pleasures of making and decoding
imitations, artisans across pre-modern Europe put these pleasures to work as copy-
ing of schemata made by master craftsmen became the literal core of apprenticeship
and the prolegomenon to study of the privileged subject of art, the human body.
(Aristotle 1987, Gombrich 1960, Muller et al. 1984) But, among intellectuals eager
to secure the elevated status of painting and sculpture, the mimesis proper to what
would come to be called the “fine arts” was understood to be based in imitation of
ideas generated in the mind of the artist. (Panofsky 1968, Belting 1996) As a work of
genius, this artistic imitation was to originate in but transcend observed, imperfect
nature by reconciling it with idealized conceptions. “Noble painters and sculptors”,
so claimed Hooke’s contemporary Giovan Pietro Bellori, “. . . form in their minds
an example of higher beauty, and by contemplating that, they emend nature with-
out fault of color or of line” (2005, 57). Rich and various as its permutations are,
imitation in this ennobling tradition of early modern artistic academies was centrally
concerned with idealization (Lee 1940).
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Academic idealization was, of course, not the only option to which a figure like
Hooke could turn; part of what motivated claims like Bellori’s was the perceived
influence of apparently non-idealizing modes of imitative depiction. Notorious in
artistic circles were painters like Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio whose puta-
tive commitment to the imitation of nature in extremis threatened the supposed
dignity of art (Marin 1995). As recent scholarship has emphasized, these natu-
ralistic currents can be seen in instructive dialogue with the cultures of science
emerging across sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe (Crombie 1994, Smith
2004). While numerous examples might be mustered from Hooke’s activities to
corroborate his interest in such naturalistic imitations—from picture-making with
the camera obscura to casting carp from life—his own writings are most suc-
cinct. Nothing, Hooke would observe in a planned introduction to a universal atlas,
is “more conducive to the assistance of the memory understanding and memory
then a plaine simple cleer and uncompounded Representation of the Object to the
Sense” (ca. 1680, f 2). It is this non-idealizing “descriptive” mode of depiction that
has served to characterize Hooke’s representational activity and the central visual
concerns of the Royal Society more broadly.
The problem with this account is that it is simply difficult to see what light it
sheds on representations like Hooke’s bullets. Descriptive picturing and naturalistic
copying are supposed to be founded upon the production of telling resemblances
between an observed target and the representation. But, there was no percepti-
ble target that Hooke’s bullets could possibly resemble. Micro-level globules were
wholly invisible, theoretical entities whose properties could only be known by ratio-
nal inference. Worse, far from being some deft resemblance that Hooke had newly
caught with his keen, microscopic eye, the rendering of quasi-atomic particles as
spheroids was a central convention—even cliché—of physical thought reaching well
back to classical antiquity (Lüthy 2000, Meinel 2004). Patently un-seeable, Hooke’s
globules could “resemble” bullets only when this convention of atomist thought was
in place. And this was a matter of faith, not of observation. Therefore, if we insist
upon finding a period, pictorial analogue for Hooke’s crystallization model (and this
is an option I exercise only rhetorically), we might look less to the still-life paintings
perfected in the early modern Netherlands and instead think with contemporane-
ous Spanish renderings of religious visions (Stoichita 1995). Like those painters in
seventeenth century Spain who drew upon a rich vocabulary of pictorial conven-
tions to represent marvelous visions accessible to saints’ eyes alone, so (this tortured
reading might propose) Hooke utilized a stock atomist convention whereby elemen-
tary particles were spherical so as to visualize the imperceptible sub-structures of
crystalline matter.
By clarifying this theoretical ontology of globules, Hooke’s crystallization model
brings us to the limits of interpretative utility for the available terms of pictorial
depiction; there was simply no visible entity it could copy. Instead, this analysis
indicates that a very funny thing had happened. Hooke certainly invokes the termi-
nology resemblance or imitation to make his theoretical entities comprehensible;
globules are bullet-like. But, to be “like” globules, these bullets—the key com-
ponents of Hooke’s crystallization model—had then to become unlike any actual,
physical bullets available to familiar apprehension. How are we to understand the
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enhanced bullets that seem to populate Hooke’s crystallization model? And what
exactly is the nature of their “likeness” to the theorized globules?
Hooke, as we have seen, understood globules to be nearly spherical particles of
matter governed by forces of congruity and incongruity that form into regular, geo-
metrical configurations through vibrating motion. So we have also noted, physical
bullets agitated on an inclining plane could not actually have generated the geo-
metrical patterns that Hooke had claimed and depicted in Micrographia. Therefore,
it is instructive to think of the bullets envisioned in this crystallization model not
as actual, physical objects, but as continuous with the frictionless planes, spherical
planets and other central stylizations deployed in scientific modeling. Indeed, such
a view of models and their components as imagined physical entities has recently
been advanced by in philosophy of science. Like literary fiction, so Roman Frigg
argues, scientific models instantiate varieties of serious make-believe, fictionalizing
their components to yield truths about the representational worlds they generate and
enabling comparisons between those fictions and reality. Models, in this analysis,
are “hypothetical entities that, as a matter of fact, do not exist spatio-temporally
but . . . would be physical things if they were real” (Frigg 2009, 3). Read in this
way, the bullets of Hooke’s model might be seen as fictionalized or imagined so that
they share relevant properties with the theoretical globules. Hooke’s model asks us
to imagine, in other words, that if the bullets were real, they would behave like
globules. And because globules are theorized to form into regular, geometrical con-
figurations when agitated, the vibration of these fictionalized bullets would yield the
geometrical patterns we see depicted in Micrographia.
Framed in this way, the relationship of “likeness” noted between Hooke’s
imagination-enhanced bullets and his globules can be apprehended more precisely.
A useful clue in this direction is supplied by historian Penelope Gouk (1999,
218) who has described Hooke’s musical, mechanical and other trials at the Royal
Society as:
. . . attempts to prove, or at least render plausible, his theory of vibrating matter through
experimental demonstration. It was on the basis of such simple and verifiable experiments
that Hooke claimed analogous principles were operating beyond the range of ordinary sense
perception.
If we bracket her “simplicity” and “experimental verifiability”, Gouk’s attention
to principles of analogy is surely useful for understanding Hooke’s enterprise.6 That
is, the imagination-enhanced bullets are not the same as globules; but they can be
6Even if we have no specific endorsement of this line from Hooke for the crystallization model, this
style of thinking certainly finds support in his contemporaneous writing. Earlier in Micrographia,
Hooke had noted: “It seldom happens that any two natures have so many properties coincident
or the same . . . and to be different in the rest” (1665, 14). Therefore, he continues, “I think it
neither impossible, irrational, nay nor difficult to be able to predict what is likely to happen in
other particulars also . . . if the circumstances that so often very much conduce to the variation of
the effects be duly weigh’d and consider’d” (1665, 14). Appealing to classical induction, in other
words, patterns observable in the bullets and numerous other vibrating phenomena the encourage
inference about the properties of those imperceptible physical structures undergirding them all.
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seen as analogically related to them. As Mary Hesse has argued (Hesse 1966b),
analogical models like this proceed by identifying properties shared between sys-
tems and eliminating their differences or negative analogies. Exploration of the
better known system is then used to make predictions about the more obscure one.
Therefore, we could say, Hooke’s understood his enhanced bullets and his glob-
ules to share the following positive analogies: both were nearly spherical in shape;
in vibrating motion; governed by forces of congruity and incongruity; and capable
of forming into regular geometrical patterns. Properties they did not share might
include their differences in size and frequency of vibration, or the shininess, salty
taste or other accidental properties of the bullets in their possible improved state.
What the model claims to offer, then, is a mechanism based on trials with the better-
known system (the enhanced bullets) through which to predict patterns generated
by the obscure, theorized particles called globules at increasing levels of complex-
ity. The data yielded by this model is what we see depicted in the figures from
Micrographia.
In this light, our schematic account of the model might thus be updated in the
following way:
Figures −−−(depict)−−−> Imagined Bullets −−− represent by analogy −−−> “Globules”
Through imaginatively stylizing its putative physical company of vibrated bul-
lets, Hooke’s analogical model creates a mechanism with which to study the
behavior of theorized entities. What we see represented in Micrographia are data
yielded by this model.
This is intended to be a charitable reading of how Hooke’s model was supposed
to work. More fundamentally, it is a reading pursued as a means of rethinking
both the opposition of representation versus experiment and the grip of pictorial
mimesis in which Hooke’s visual activities have been repeatedly plotted. Even
under such limited analysis as this, however, the constraints of Hooke’s model
appear strikingly and tellingly acute. Rather than being too closely related to exper-
iment as had been worried at the outset, Hooke’s crystallization model ends up
appearing overly distanced from it. With the bullets fictionalized into analogy with
theoretical globules and no longer answering to the physical behavior of actual
bullets in the trial situation Hooke had stipulated, it is hard to know how much
information could possibly have been yielded by work with the model—or even
what such work might have looked like. Did manipulation of actual bullets main-
tain any relevance to the project? Or, had the model entirely become a kind of
thought experiment?7 Indeed, it is instructive to remember here how Kuhn him-
self observed that seventeenth century experimentalists like Hooke were actually
closest in spirit to the older traditions of theory-illustrating experiment precisely in
7Further pursuit of these points could productively engage with the stimulating reading of thought
experiments and fictions proposed by David Davis (see “Learning through Fictional Narratives in
Art and Science” in this volume).
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those trials claiming to “reveal the shape, arrangement, and notion of corpuscles”
(1977, 43).
In turning from the bullets to the arguably more successful model that Hooke
devised to represent a comet with a wax ball and sulfuric acid, it is nonetheless
worth stressing the representational complexity involved in the production of a
seemingly humble material model like this, which Hooke himself had called a “gross
Similitude”. Hooke’s bullets are convincingly explicable neither as the imitation of
nature nor as the illustration of theory. Instead, projects like this aimed at the con-
struction of a species of serious make-believe that could yield meaningful insight
into obscure or imperceptible entities through work with a stylized representational
proxy. Conventional stipulations, imaginative enhancements, analogy, and possi-
bly deep fiction—all contributed to Hooke’s seemingly innocuous study of crystals.
Thus, however we wish to understand the varieties of representation instantiated by
its images, the crucial point is that the pictures found in Micrographia are data from
Hooke’s modeling enterprise, not the privileged interpretive key to it. If anything,
pictures were but one facet of the experimentalist’s representational approach as it
moved between theory, performance and material practice.
In Some Things Analogous to the One, and Somewhat
to the Other, Though not Exactly the Same with Either
In the last weeks of April 1677, a comet became perceptible in the skies above
northern Europe. From his observation turret in London’s Gresham College, Robert
Hooke studied the comet from April 21 until it disappeared a week later. (see Hooke
1935, 286–287) Even without the assistance of the six and fifteen foot reflecting
telescopes that Hooke used in his private observatory, the comet’s teardrop tip and
broom-like tail must have cut an impressive figure above the nocturnal cityscape
of later seventeenth century London (Fig. 2). So the illustrative plate prepared by
engraver Francis Lamb from Hooke’s own drawings suggests, the Curator was fas-
cinated by comets and committed significant energy to their study. But while he cast
a jaundiced eye upon the millenarian prognostications that they elicited amongst the
early modern European public, Hooke also had doubts about the calculations of
comets’ orbits and parallax motions as produced by his scientific contemporaries.
Instead, Hooke took a typically pragmatic course in his own studies. Recognizing
the limits of available instruments to provide accurate information about comets’
speed, distance from the Earth, and possible orbits, he concentrated on what could be
learned about comets from observation. Based upon his studies of the 1677 object,
Cometa of 1678 set out an impressive account of how comets come to exhibit their
characteristic features: an antisolar tail, luminosity and erratic motion. Briefly eluci-
dating the theory he set out in 1678, I want to turn to the sequence of models Hooke
contrived to reconcile this theory with his observations.
In Cometa, Hooke postulates that a comet begins as a semi-solid, spheroid body
and gradually decomposes due to its significant internal instabilities. Utilizing the
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style of reasoning we have seen him deploying in his earlier crystallization model,
Hooke found evidence for comets’ instability through analogy with the behavior of
the Earth. Although it seems to be “generally very dense, compact, and very closely
and solidly united”, Hooke’s pioneering lectures on the Earth’s volcanic eruptions
and magnetic variations had shown that the planet “may be notwithstanding more
loose, and ununited, and moveable from certain causes” (1678b, 11, Drake 1996).
Comets, he proposes, are similar, albeit in a more extreme form: “It seems very
probable to me, that the body of Comets may be of the same nature and constitu-
tion with that of the internal parts of the Earth, that these parts may by the help
of the Aether, be so agitated and blended together, as to make them work upon,
and dissolve each other” (1678b, 11–12). Susceptible to the reagent aether because
of this internal agitation, the comet’s disintegration accelerates, causing it to lose
mass and gravitational force. And because he understood gravitation through the
aforementioned dynamics of congruity and incongruity, Hooke was provided with
an explanation of the formation of the comet’s tail:
The parts thus dissolved are elevated to a greater distance from the center of the Star or
Nucleus, or the superficies of it, whose gravitating or attractive principle is much destroyed,
. . . but having given those parts leave thus far to ramble, the gravitating principle of another
body more potent acts upon it, and makes those parts seem to recede from the center
thereof, though really they are but as it were, left behind the body of the Star, which is
more powerfully attracted that the minuter streaming parts (1678b, 12).
As the head of the comet inclines towards the gravitating body of the sun with
which it is congruous, so the more incongruous particles of the tail trail behind.
In this way, Hooke’s theory of internal agitation compounded by reaction to aether
could explain the comet’s characteristic, observable trait of the anti-solar tail, which
had been depicted so elegantly in Cometa’s plates.
Hooke’s theory could also offer an account of comets’ peculiar celestial motion.
Once destabilized, he argues, the comet’s magnetic relations become disturbed, no
longer holding it in “that circular way” of a stable orbit (1678b, 13). Instead, the
comet “flies away from its former center by the Tangent line to the last place, where
it was before this confusion was caused in the body of it” (1678b, 13). Projecting
tangentially outward from its former orbital trajectory, the comet enters into the
gravitational fields of other bodies in its new path. Such attractions only intensify its
disintegration, thereby lengthening its tail to upwards of seventy telescopic degrees
(1678b, 13). Combined with the reaction to aether and compounded by the attraction
of neighboring celestial bodies, comets’ internal agitation informs Hooke’s account
of their enigmatic orbital behavior.8 What Cometa effectively offers, then, is a theo-
retical template for explaining the observed form and unusual trajectories of comets,
while elucidating their genesis from the deterioration of stable celestial bodies.
In turning from this theory to the material models Hooke would use to reconcile
it with observation, I want to draw more explicitly upon studies of modeling from
8For Hooke’s broader understanding of the internal motion of planetary bodies, see Hooke’s
Lectures and Discourse of Earthquakes in Hooke (1705, 149–190).
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recent analytic philosophy of science, which remain largely unknown in art history
and visual studies. Since the early 1960s, the study of models has occupied cen-
ter stage in the philosophy of science, and both their relation to theory and to their
respective targets have been the subject of heated debate. One crucial argument of
this literature has been that models do not simply illustrate or instantiate abstract
theories. Instead, they frequently depart in important ways both from the theories
they ostensibly embody and the worldly targets they are used to explore. This view
has received its most advanced statement within the so-called Models as Mediators
project (Morgan and Morrison 1999). Multifarious in form and often intractable in
function, models might thus be said to possess “lives of their own”. Because of
their partial independence or “autonomy”, this literature argues that we see mod-
els as standing between—thus, mediating—theory and experimental engagement
with nature. Although it is not above critique9, this “models-as-mediators” approach
is particularly useful for elucidating how Robert Hooke worked with his material
representations of comets in the late 1670s.
Once he had set out his theory of their physical form, Hooke offered the reader
of Cometa a way to “make a perfect representation of the body, and beard [i.e. tail]
of the Comet” (1678b, 31). As he directs:
Take a very clear long Cylindrical Glass, which may hold about a quart of water; fill it three
quarters full with water, and put into it a quarter of a pound of Oyl of Vitriol [sulfuric acid],
and in the midst of this suspend by a small silver wire, a small wax-ball, rould in filings of
iron or steel, and you may plainly observe a perfect representation of the Head, Halo, and
Beard of the Comet (1678b, 31).
Although I have not been able to replicate this action even to the modest degree
of Hooke’s crystallization model, the chemistry it requires is relatively simple. The
iron in the filings covering the head of the “comet” reacts with the sulfuric acid
to create hydrogen gas. These hydrogen bubbles rapidly rise to the surface of the
acid solution, which has been diluted with water presumably to control the rate of
reaction.10 In a general sense, Hooke’s account might be read to suggest that the
reaction of the acid and the ferrous particles in the wax ball yields a visual effect
resembling his target system; the bubbling ball looked like a comet. Yet, Hooke’s
model repays consideration in different sense—one wherein observation and manip-
ulation of this strange, effervescent cocktail leads to knowing about extraterrestrial
bodies. For, this model departed in important ways not only from Hooke’s observa-
tions of meteoric bodies in April 1677, but from his theory of comets more broadly.
How and exactly what this mediating model represented thus needs to be examined
carefully.
To elaborate these points, I want to make use of the “DDI” (denotation, demon-
stration, and interpretation) analysis put forward by philosopher of science R.I.G.
9For a critique, see Giere (1999).
10I thank David Tirrell and Tony Jia for discussing this action with me.
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Hughes (1997). Although but one of several approaches to the study of models avail-
able within recent philosophy of science, Hughes’ account is particularly useful
here insofar as it specifically avoids appeal to mimesis. Instead, integrating Nelson
Goodman’s claim that resemblance is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for representation, Hughes’ analysis can help us to peel back the veneer of plausi-
bility that attends to Hooke’s model and to schematize its structure. First, following
Hughes’ approach, we need to isolate what the model denotes. The wax ball in the
model denotes the solid core of the comet, which Hooke had theorized “to be made
of solid matter, not fluid; that the body of it especially, is considerably dense, but that
the haziness or Coma about it is much more rarified, and the tail thereof is most of
all” (1678b, 9). Secondly, the dramatic reaction of the comet to surrounding aether
is denoted in the model by the evolution of hydrogen gas from the iron and sulfuric
acid. As with comets, Hooke observed, “the menstruum falling on, or dissolving the
iron, there is a continual eruption of small bubbles, and dissolv’d particles from the
sides of this body” (1678b, 31–32). Finally, the force of solar gravitation that pro-
duces the comet’s characteristic tail is denoted in the model by the gravitation of the
earth upon the glass tube and its contents. “Being of a much lighter consistence than
the anbient liquor”, Hooke explains, bubbles in the glass tube denote the particles
that “are by the greater gravity of that, continually protruded upwards” to simulate
the tail of the comet (1678b, 32).
In the second stage of schematic analysis that Hughes calls “demonstration”, we
set out how the representational terms of the model can lead to new understanding
of the target. Hooke explains this dynamic in the following way: “If we suppose the
Aether to be somewhat analogous to a menstruum, and that there is a gravitation
towards the center of the Sun, if the Nucleus or head of the Comet be supposed such
a dissoluble substance, the phaenomena of the shape of the Comet may, I think, be
rationally explained” (1678b, 32). Having appointed denotational values to humble
materials and forces, Hooke’s model provides a scenario in which the consequent
effects may be observed. Visualizing the comet as a field of ferrous particles reacting
with sulfuric acid, the material model creates an opportunity to observe the simu-
lated forces of gravitation and aether-resistance upon elusive meteoric bodies, which
could never be examined “first hand”.
What makes this model especially interesting are the ways in which Hooke
sought to gain cognitive purchase on comets through reconciling study of this
materialization with observational data. Although our only surviving evidence of
Hooke’s actual work with his model comes from the following remarks, he makes
clear that observation and manipulation of the bubbling wax ball could enable the
scientist to “interpret” (in Hughes’ terminology) the relations between model and
target phenomena. So Hooke claims:
By this Hypothesis [i.e. the model] the phaenomena of the Comet may be solved; for hence
‘tis easie to deduce the reason why the Beard grows broader and broader, and fainter and
fainter towards the top: why there is a Halo about the body; for this will appear clearly in
the experiment: why the Beard becomes a little deflected from the body of the Sun; for if
the dissolving Ball be by the wire mov’d either this way or that way, the arising steam or
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bubbles will bend the contrary: . . . by this supposition also ‘twill be easie to explicate why
the beard is sometime bended, and not straight, and why it is sometimes brighter upon the
one side than upon another? why the bottom of it is more round, and the other sides more
undefin’d; and divers of the like phaenomena (1678b, 32).
By Hooke’s analysis, observation and intervention into the behavior of the mate-
rial model—including moving the wax ball “this way or that”—calls attention to
phenomena observable in comets themselves. The bent stream of bubbles caused
by manipulation of the model allows the investigator to hypothesize the presence of
similar effects in the target system and to draw inferences about their causes. In this
way, the model possesses what Hughes calls an “internal dynamic” that enables the
user to draw “hypothetical conclusions about the world over and above the data we
started with” (1997, S331).
How exactly did this chemical cocktail thereby represent Hooke’s comet?
Ingenious as this material model was, it stood in uncomfortable relation both to
crucial aspects of Hooke’s theory of comets and to what he had actually observed
in April 1677. As we have seen, Hooke made much of the ability of his bubbling
wax ball to model the reaction between aether and the meteoric body that created
the comet’s tail. Yet, by privileging factors that could be admirably visualized in
the model such as dissolution in a reagent and its response to the force of gravity,
Hooke had to compromise a crucial piece of his comet theory. After all, he had
claimed that what made comets exhibit behavior so notably different from other
satellites similarly exposed to the corrosive effects of aether was their extreme inter-
nal agitation.11 In concert with the action of the aether, it was this internal activity
that Hooke theorized as causing the destabilization of the proto-comet’s gravita-
tional and magnetic properties, while completely altering its orbital trajectory. In
his material model, however, the decomposition of the comet was simulated as an
exclusively and literally superficial process. The reader had been told how the solid
wax core should be “rould in filings of iron or steel” (1678b, 31). It would be fasci-
nating to know if and how Hooke might have attempted to engineer a model closer to
his theory that could simultaneously deteriorate from discrete, yet complementary,
internal and external causes. Nonetheless, the evidence we have suggests that the
materiality of Hooke’s made-model not only simplified but significantly departed
from this crucial component of his comet theory.
More problematic for Hooke was the fact that the wax ball also failed to match
a key feature of observed comets: the model could not generate light.12 Here too
the philosophical literature on mediating models is instructive. What this literature
has emphasized is that because models can represent their targets only partially,
scientists frequently compensate by generating numerous different models of any
given system under examination. The various different models of the nucleus used in
physics are exemplary. As Margaret Morrison and Mary S. Morgan observe: “Each
11Hooke did not know that the earth too possesses an antisolar ion tail; see Yeomans (1990, 352).
12In 1682, Hooke described a revised version of this material model that could produce light; see
Hooke (1705, 167).
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individual model fails to incorporate significant features of the nucleus, for example,
the liquid drop [model] ignores quantum statistics and treats the nucleus classically.
While others ignore different quantum mechanical properties, they nevertheless are
able to map onto technologies in a way that makes them successful, independent
sources of knowledge” (1999, 23–24). Hooke’s response to the limits of his wax-ball
comet model is telling in this way. Conceding its inability to explain the important,
observed feature of luminescence, Hooke concludes Cometa by canvassing a wide
field of other possible models for comets’ generation of light. “Decaying fish, rotten
wood, glow-worms, &c.” are all offered as possible analogues before Hooke intro-
duces a new set of models (1678b, 46). A comet’s luminous head, he postulates, is
like a torch or a battery of cannons whose “blazing Granadoes or Fire-balls” follow
the parabolic motion of projectiles as established by seventeenth century physics—
and so we see visualized in a compelling diagram also provided in Cometa (1678b,
46, 48) (Fig. 2).
Although these postulations are given little further treatment, Hooke’s tactical or
pragmatic approach to representation becomes increasingly clear over the course of
Cometa. None of his various comet models can promise to fully reconcile theory and
observation. But each can denote discrete, appointed features and thereby offer to
bring aspects of cometary phenomena into demonstration and interpretation. Stating
a veritable motto of this approach to representation, Hooke concludes of his models
that comets are “in some things analogous to the one, and somewhat to the other,
though not exactly the same with either” (1678b, 47). By way of conclusion, I want
to suggest how historians of art might productively learn from this representational
pragmatism, particularly as we study visual practices generated at the boundaries of
early modern art and science. Beyond the important insight it offers to the historical
context of Robert Hooke and his colleagues, though, this analysis also allows us to
reconsider the integral problems shared by students of the visual and philosophers
of science on a larger scale.
It Behove Them, Who Professe the Knowledge of Nature or
Reason, Rightly to Apprehend the Severall Waies Whereby They
may be Expressed
Trained as a painter and gifted as an experimenter, English philosopher Robert
Hooke has risen to prominence in recent historical studies that have celebrated
the connections between visual art and the “new sciences” of seventeenth century
Europe. The lavish plates of Hooke’s Micrographia have been repeatedly cited as
evidence of this union. Made from observations with optical instruments, they sug-
gest both the keen-eyed attentiveness to optical detail seen in seventeenth century
painting and the guiding imprint of a novel conception of experiment—the produc-
tion of new facts about nature through what Francis Bacon called the “vexations of
art”. By contrast, as has been the case more broadly (Hopwood and de Chadarevian
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2004), Hooke’s material models have received markedly less attention.13 Reasons
for this neglect are perhaps not difficult to find. Unlike the stunning illustrative
plates of Micrographia, Cometa or Hooke’s numerous other publications, no direct
physical evidence is known to survive from his material models. In this way, they
challenge both the time-honored methods of art-historical analysis and the favor
for material culture exhibited in recent history of science (Galison 1997, Daston
2004). To make matters worse, no physical evidence may ever have existed of these
models. As we have seen, it is difficult to know if and how Hooke’s crystalliza-
tion model—a representation wherein bullets with imagined properties were used
to generate behavior of theoretical entities—ever actually required physical objects.
Treading such uncomfortable ground between categories of experiment and theory,
Hooke’s models were strange, intermediary enterprises that could answer exactly to
neither category and that departed in important ways from both.
With these doubts in mind, we might return to the quasi-existential question
sketched at the outset. Why exactly should art historians or other students of the
visual bother with these baffling activities which only seem to complicate the attrac-
tive, available view of Hooke and his colleagues as able copyists of natural facts?
As is implicit in the foregoing argument, what I see as at stake in engaging with the
evidence of material models are matters essential to the historical understanding of
early scientific visuality and to the conceptual vitality of the art/science conversa-
tion. I will treat the historical argument first. We know that early scientific bodies
like the Royal Society of London were organized around and gave particular priv-
ilege to experimental trials. However, as is revealed in the work of Robert Hooke,
the Royal Society’s central experimental performer and theorist, trials that initially
appear to be clear-cut cases of experimentation may actually be better understood
as varieties of representation. If glimpsed only fragmentarily through the modest
sampling presented here, these models were various in form and diverse in func-
tion; they deployed varieties of representational strategy and were allotted different
degrees of cognitive value. Now, such interest in employing a broad range of rep-
resentations and commanding an expanded field of visual activity are importantly
commensurate with the evidence of recent historical studies, which are altering our
apprehension of visuality in the early Royal Society. If recent studies have shown
how Hooke and Wren were polymathic masters of drawing, architecture, survey-
ing and numerous other visual practices, their scientific colleagues in the Royal
Society’s ambit were no less inclined to experimenting with representation; they
contrived ingenious of modes of encryption, pictographic writing, and automated
notation along with forays into optical projection and anamorphic wizardry.14
The crucial, historical point to be apprehend here is that those in the early scien-
tific community identified such polymorphous visual fluency as a virtue. Not long
before he served as a mentor to Robert Hooke at Oxford, catalyst of seventeenth
century English science John Wilkins published a text on cryptography. Therein,
13A rare exception here is Iliffe (1995, esp. 293–299).
14For extended discussion, images and further bibliography, see Hunter (2007).
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Wilkins claimed: “As it will concerne a man that deals in trafficke, to understand
the severall kinds of money, and that it may be framed of other materialls besides
silver and gold, so likewise do’s it behove them, who professe the knowledge of
nature or reason, rightly to apprehend the severall waies whereby they may be
expressed” (1641, 11). If Wilkins’ dictum is keenly pertinent for understanding
Hooke’s approach to modeling as exposited here, it is more broadly instructive
for what has emerged as an important direction in recent studies of early mod-
ern art and science. As we have seen with Hooke’s models of the comet, being
able to harness a range of representations culled from the imaginative interpretation
of physical processes was critically advantageous to the experimental philosopher.
But, this broad-ranging knowledge of physical materials and their imaginative, rep-
resentational potential was simultaneously crucial to the architectural and other
visual activities that Hooke, Wren and others practiced in later Baroque London.
Thus, drawing tools from philosophy of science, we may better analyze the diverse
representational techniques actually deployed and valued by early experimental
philosophers. More fundamentally, we can simultaneously apprehend how diverse
forms and functions of visual practice were essential to the science and art engi-
neered by figures like Hooke and Wren. Rather than just reinforcing the familiar
linkage of naturalism in painting and empiricism in science, this interpretation
would advance by analyzing the performances and procedures at the very center
of their scientific community’s attention.
This leads to the second, conceptual point. For, what recent work in philosophy
asks us to recognize in scientific representations are degrees of complexity, sophisti-
cation and, above all, degrees of distance from natural targets that are almost entirely
absent from humanities-based accounts. In his contribution to this volume, for
example, Anjan Chakravartty treats the contention that “descriptions of entities and
processes afforded by scientific representations are generally false, strictly speak-
ing”, as so uncontroversial a claim that it necessitates no further argument. Cutting
directly against the grain of much received wisdom in humanities-based art/science
studies, such philosophical work ask us to see scientific models as stylized artifacts
invested with cognitive value and modified by varieties of imaginative intervention.
Introduced into serious games of make-believe, these models can mediate between
observables and theory, generating meaningful insight into real-world systems even
as they are highly indifferent to particular facts about their targets. To art historians
and humanists more generally, questions of how ostensibly fictional objects can be
invested with imaginative values and take on “lives of their own” are not marginal
matters. As only the seminal volumes of David Freedberg (1989), Hans Belting
(1994) and W.J.T. Mitchell (2005) need indicate, such questions are absolutely
central to the Western artistic tradition.
In thinking with this research in philosophy of science, then, historians of art
might reconsider both the conception of scientific representation now dominant in
the humanities and the archive from which that conception has been drawn. As noted
at the outset, pictures and illustrations have long served humanists as the crucial evi-
dence of representation in science. These pictures have also come to be seen not only
as the key archive of scientific representation but also the acme of its aspirations. So
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Robert Hooke’s work examined here suggests, though, pictorial artifacts constitute
only a fragmentary component of the highly imaginative, stylized ways in which
natural objects may be manipulated, fictionalized and performed as representations
to advance scientific understanding. Examining exactly what these “clever objects”
are and how they embody, direct or inform imaginative thought are questions we
might begin to ask. But, these are questions we can also share. For if we can learn
from the methods and ethos of recent philosophy of science, so art historians can
bring to discussion the discipline’s rich tradition of thinking about the properties of
the aesthetic object and the various powers over the imagination latent to it. Our
conversation need not be to explain “Art” by virtue of “Science” (or vice versa),
but to theorize the representational practices that run between them and beyond
them.
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